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Israel’s SIGINT Oversight Ecosystem: COVID-19 Secret 
Location Tracking as a Test Case 
19 U.N.H. L. Rev. 451 (2021) 
A B S T R A C T .   By mid-March 2020, Israel had experienced the first wave of the COVID-19 
pandemic. Within a fortnight, confirmed coronavirus cases surged from half a dozen to 178 cases. 
In response to the challenge of identifying potential carriers, the government tasked the Israeli 
Security Agency (the ISA, or Shin Bet) with tracing the routes of confirmed coronavirus patients 
via cellphone location tracking and identifying individuals with whom the patients had been in 
close contact.  
Israel's ISA communications metadata collection measures have been shrouded in veil of 
secrecy. The debate – in parliament and in court – regarding the use of the country's secret service 
counterterrorism mass surveillance measures to contain the spread of the pandemic is a rare 
opportunity to assess whether the institutional oversight mechanisms on SIGINT collection 
activities are sufficient and effective.  
The paper will (1) describe the existing SIGINT oversight regime in Israel; (2) describe the 
SIGINT oversight ecosystem’s response to COVID-19 location tracking in Israel; and, (3) in light 
of existing literature, provide an analysis of that response.  
 
A U T H O R .   Research Fellow, Federmann Cyber Security Center – Cyber Law Program, Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem; Researcher, Israel Democracy Institute. The Author wishes to thank the 
Symposium Editor, Derek Kaufman, and the University of New Hampshire Law Review editorial 




T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  N E W  H A M P S H I R E  L A W  R E V I E W  1 9 : 2  ( 2 0 2 1 )  
452 
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 453
II. SIGINT AND METADATA ACQUISITION IN ISREAL ............................ 454
III. THE ISRAELI SIGINT OVERSIGHT ECOSYSTEM ................................. 460
IV. COVID-19 IN ISREAL: COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES TO WARD 
OFF A PLAGUE ........................................................................................ 470
V. THE OVERSIGHT ECOSYSTEM RESPONSE TO COVID-19 .................... 477
A. Internal and Executive Oversight ................................................................ 477
B. Judicial Oversight ....................................................................................... 478
C. Parliamentary Oversight ............................................................................ 479
D. The Privacy Protection Authority ................................................................. 481
E. The State Controller .................................................................................... 483
F. Civil Society ................................................................................................ 484
G. Revisiting Eskens et al. ............................................................................... 485
VI. COVID-19 AS A TEST CASE? ................................................................... 488
 
 
I S R A E L ’ S  S I G I N T  O V E R S I G H T  E C O S Y S T E M  
453 
I . I N T R O D U C T I O N  
"The [Internal Affairs] committee states that there were some past incidents that 
could have been viewed as deviating from a direct security interest; The committee 
expresses its will that principle under which these services operate only in matters 
directly pertaining to the security of Israel shall be strictly followed."  
These two laconic lines by the Israeli’s Knesset ad hoc parliamentary 
subcommittee for the matter of secret wiretapping devices and secret party services 
concluded the parliamentary response to the two Shin Bet operatives discovered in 
January 1953 while installing listening devices in the headquarters of the United 
Workers Party (Mapam). In the early years of the Israeli state, the mere existence of 
the Shin Bet, the domestic security service later to be known as the Shabak, the 
General Security Service (GSS) or the Israel Security Agency (ISA), was kept secret 
and was employed by the dominant ruling party, the Workers of Eretz-Israel Party 
(Mapai) against political opponents.2  
In the following decades, public, parliamentary, and judicial attention to 
intelligence oversight in Israel tended to focus on HUMINT (Human Intelligence) 
investigatory powers.  More than half a century later, the COVID-19 pandemic 
reawakened the public discourse regarding the regulation and oversight of 
government surveillance practices.  The policy undertaken by the Israeli 
government in the wake of the first wave of the coronavirus – employing 
 
1  DK (1956) 357, 370 (Isr.). 
2  Ian Black & Benny Morris, Israel's Secret Wars 149–153 (1991)  However, it should be 
noted that some of the Shin Bet counterespionage activities targeting Mapam were justified. 
According to the KGB archive, some Mapam MKs did in fact share classified information with the 
Soviet Union. See Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our 
Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World, (2005).
3  See for example the overview by Bitton, which highlights HUMINT cases such as the torture 
ruling by the high court of justice. Raphael Bitton, In Law We Trust: The Israeli Case of Overseeing 
Intelligence, in Global Intelligence Oversight: Governing Security in the 21st Century 
141 (Zachary K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff eds., 2016) [hereinafter Global Intelligence 
Oversight]. 
4  It should be noted, however, that there was privacy-centered public discourse in Israel 
during the first two decades of the 21st century. The still ongoing campaign against the 
government biometric database and the campaign against the “Big Brother Law” (the 
Communications Data Law, see infra note 20), the latter culminating in HCJ 3809/08 Association 
for Civil Rights in Israel v. Israeli Police (2012) (Isr.) (unpublished), non-official English 
translation available at https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/association-civil-rights-israel-v-
israel-police [https://perma.cc/PX9X-F85N][hereinafter ACRI]. For the campaign against the 
biometric database, see Michelle Spektor, Imagining the Biometric Future: Debates Over National 
Biometric Identification in Israel, 29 Science as Culture 100–126 (2020).
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surveillance measures which were reserved for counterterrorism purposes to 
contain the spread of the virus  – was not adopted by any other western democracy.  
Whereas routine ISA practices are shrouded in secrecy for operational reasons, the 
unique biopolitical nature of Covid-19 surveillance, coupled with the political 
stalemate within which Israel met the first wave of the pandemic, fostered a publicly 
open response by oversight actors and an open debate of the ISA’s online 
surveillance measures. 
This paper will first briefly introduce the SIGINT oversight ecosystem in Israel 
during routine, non-COVID-related times and its applicable legal framework. Then 
it shall provide an outline of the response of the various actors of the Israeli SIGINT 
oversight ecosystem to the ISA’s coronavirus surveillance, and will evaluate its main 
product, the Authorization Law.  Then it shall proceed to analyze the performance 
of the SIGINT oversight ecosystem in the COVID-19 epidemic, and assess what 
lessons can be learned regarding its performance in routine, COVID-free times. 
I I . S I G I N T  A N D  M E T A D A T A  A C Q U I S I T I O N  I N  I S R E A L  
The use of Signals Intelligence measures by Israeli intelligence services can be 
traced back to the era predating the formation of the country, as Jewish resistance 
movements operated comprehensive wiretapping operations, listening in on 
British officials and Arab leaders.  However, Signals Intelligence, or SIGINT, is not 
just wiretapping: it is, rather, a plethora of intelligence disciplines deriving 
information from electronic devices. This paper shall use the terms “SIGINT” and 
“online surveillance” interchangeably, to refer to intelligence measures involving 
the interception, collection, and analysis of data originating from electronic 
 
5  Joseph A. Cannataci (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy), Report, 78, U.N. Doc. 
A/75/147 (July 27, 2020). 
6  For a comparative review of contact tracing measures, see Tehila Shwartz Altshuler & Rachel 
Aridor Hershkowitz, Digital Contact Tracing and the Coronavirus: Israeli and 
Comparative Perspectives (Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2020). 
7  The Law to Authorize the ISA to Assist in the National Effort to Contain the 
Spread of the Novel Coronavirus and to Promote Use of Civilian Technology to Locate 
Individuals who were in Close Contact with Patients (Temporary Provisions) 5780-
2020, SH 2816, 166 (Isr.), https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/502_316.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6RJJ-DU46] [hereinafter Authorization Law]. 
8   Stacy Perman, Spies, Inc.: Business innovation from Israel’s masters of espionage 
33 (2005). 
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communications.   
This paper focuses on SIGINT practices by two internal government agencies: 
the ISA, Israel’s domestic security service, whose missions are primarily 
counterterrorism and counterintelligence,  and the police – Israel’s leading law 
enforcement agency. There are other intelligence agencies in Israel’s intelligence 
community that are tasked with the collection of international SIGINT, such as the 
Mossad and Israel Defense Force’s SIGINT Unit 8200. However, the SIGINT 
practices of both agencies are not directly regulated under any specific law.  
Government-sanctioned online surveillance laws tend to differentiate between 
the rules pertaining to the interception, collection, processing and retention of 
content data and those applicable to metadata (data about the communications). 
The rules applying to the interception, collection, processing and retention of 
metadata traditionally tend to be more lax than those applying to content data and 
allow government agencies much more leeway, based on a tacit assumption that 
metadata is less revealing than content data. The same applies to Israeli online 
surveillance laws.  
However, as technology progresses, traditional legal categories may no longer 
apply. The Dutch online surveillance law, prior to its recent reform, differentiated 
between cable-bound communications and non-cable-bound communications (i.e., 
electromagnetic transmissions via antennae).12 It may be the case that in an era 
predating cellular phones, where most non-cable-bound communications were for 
military purposes, this distinction merited different rules. Nowadays, it is obsolete. 
Similarly, technological developments gradually erode the underlying assumptions 
supporting the different rules for content data and metadata, which are becoming 
as obsolete as the distinction between the contents of a letter and the address details 
of its recipient.  
 
9  Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Technical Collection of Intelligence, in Handbook of Intelligence 
Studies 105, 108–111 (Loch K. Johnson ed., 2006); Julian Richards, Signals Intelligence, in 
Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies 84, 85–93 (Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman 
And Claudia Hillebrand eds., 2014). 
10  § 7, General Security Service Law, 5972-2002, SH 1832, 172 (Isr.). [hereinafter ISA Law], non-
official English translation available at https://knesset.gov.il/review/data/eng/law/kns15_GSS_
eng.pdf.  
11  Omer Tene, Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data in Israel: Balancing Security Needs 
with Democratic Accountability in Bulk Collection: Systematic Government Access to 
Private-Sector Data 91, 106 (Fred H. Cate and James Dempsey eds., 2017). 
12  Quirine Eijkman, Nico Van Eijk & Robert Van Schaik, Dutch National Security Reform 
Under Review: Sufficient Checks and Balances in the Intelligence and Security 
Services Act 2017 21–22 (2018). 
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Indeed, “metadata,” which no longer signifies the few data points on the back 
of an envelope,  but rather a voluminous amount of information, has become more 
valuable to intelligence services than ever.  This can be attributed to the 
convenience of its analysis (content data requires either human analyst or 
sophisticated AI techniques to process in mass volumes, where automated 
processing of metadata is much easier) as well as to the prevalence of connected 
mobile devices, either cellular phones, smartphones or other Internet of Things 
(IoT) devices, which produce a constant electronic trail of their users’ activities that  
may be less ‘escapable’ than contents data.   
Another distinction found in SIGINT law worldwide is one of purpose. The 
rules applying to online surveillance for national security purposes tend to be more 
lax than those applying to law enforcement purposes.  An underlying reason is that 
the different balance of interests involved in national security justifies looser rules 
for governments engaged in SIGINT practices that infringe upon individuals’ 
privacy rights. Israel is no different.   
The interception of the contents of electronic communications for law 
enforcement purposes (by Israeli police and other law enforcement agencies) and 
 
13  See ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
14  See for example Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Privacy and 
Security: A Modern and Transparent Legal Framework (2015); European Commission for 
Democracy Through Law, Report on The Democratic Oversight Of Signals 
Intelligence Agencies, ¶48 (2015) [hereinafter Signals Intelligence Report]; 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Review of the 
Mandatory Data Retention Regime, ¶ 71 (2019). On privacy threats posed by location data and 
contact data in the context of COVID19 contact tracing, see Privacy Protection Authority, PPA 
Opinion in Accordance with the Law to Authorize the ISA to Assist in the National 
Effort to Contain the Spread of the Novel Coronavirus (Temporary Provisions) 8 (2020) 
[hereinafter PPA Opinion No. 1], available in Hebrew only at https://www.gov.il/
BlobFolder/reports/privacy-shabak-coronavirus/he/privacy-shabak-coronavirus.pdf 
15  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018). 
16  See Asaf Lubin, “We Only Spy on Foreigners”: The Myth of a Universal Right to Privacy and the 
Practice of Foreign Mass Surveillance, 18 Chi. J. Int'l 502 (2018). For U.S. cases, see for example United 
States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980). 
Recently, the German Constitutional Court ruled that the BND must still respect the fundamental 
right to privacy of individuals when engaging in mass surveillance of foreign intelligence. See 
Russell A. Miller, The German Constitutional Court Nixes Foreign Surveillance, Lawfare, May 27, 2020, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/german-constitutional-court-nixes-foreign-surveillance 
[https://perma.cc/AF7Z-JKQR]. 
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for national security purposes (by the ISA) is governed by the Wiretap Law,  which 
contains different provisions for each purpose. While police wiretapping is subject 
to a judicial warrant by a senior district judge and is limited to felony offences,  ISA 
wiretapping is not reviewed ex ante by the court, but by the Prime Minister.  
Acquisition of communications metadata by law enforcement agencies is 
regulated under the Communications Data Law,  and by the ISA under the ISA 
Law.   Pursuant to the Communications Data Law, law enforcement agencies may 
apply for a judicial warrant ordering licensed telecommunications providers  to 
provide communications metadata 
,  for purposes 
of protection of human life, investigation, detection or prevention of offences or 
offenders (of misdemeanors or felonies),  or lawful forfeiture. The police can 
request a warrant for acquisition of future metadata  limited to no more than 30 
 
17  Wiretap Law, 5739-1979, SH  938 p.188 (Isr.) [hereinafter Wiretap Law]. See also Omer Tene, 
supra note 11. 
18  § 6, Wiretap Law, supra note 17. Israeli Law distinguishes between three types of offenses: 
Felonies (offenses which bear a penalty more severe than three years of imprisonment), 
Misdemeanors (offenses which bear a penalty more severe than three months and less than three 
years of imprisonment) and Transgressions (offenses which bear a penalty of no more than three 
months of imprisonment). See § 24, Penal Law, 5737–1977, LSI (Special Volume) (Isr.).
19  § 4, Wiretap Law, supra note 17. 
20  Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement powers – Communications Data), 5768-2007, SH 2122 
72 (Isr.), https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/999_876.htm [https://perma.cc/2CXJ-XMY8] 
[hereinafter Communications Data Law].  
21  § 11, ISA Law, supra note 10. 
22  Section 1 of the Telecommunications Law 5742-1982, SH  1060 218 (Isr.) [hereinafter 
Telecommunications Law], defines Telecommunication as the “transmission, transmission or 
reception of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds or information using wire, radio, optic 
systems or any other electromagnetic system.”  Accordingly, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), 
Cellular services providers and providers of landline communication services all require a license 
under the Telecommunications Law.  
23  § 1, Communication Data Law, supra note 20, further defines Location Data (location data of 
a device held by a subscriber), Subscriber Data (type of telecommunication service provided to the 
subscriber; the subscriber’s name, address and identification number; the subscriber's payment 
method and details; the address at which the device used by the subscriber was installed; and data 
identifying the subscriber's device) and Traffic Data (communication's type, time, volume and 
length, as data identifying the source, target and any other intermediating devices used and data 
identifying the other party thereto). 
24  See §6, Wiretap Law, supra note 17. 
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days following the date of issue of the warrant. The constitutionality of the 
Communication Data Law, and in particular its infringement upon the right to 
privacy,  was challenged in ACRI v. Police,  where the High Court of Justice ruled 
that the provisions of the Communications Data law are to be construed narrowly, 
allowing for targeted collection of metadata only.  
While metadata acquisition for law enforcement purposes is subject to ex ante 
judicial review, limited to particular types of metadata, and subject to temporal 
constraints, the rules governing the ISA’s acquisition, processing and retention of 
metadata are different. Under Section 11 of the ISA Law, the Prime Minister is 
empowered to set rules that define certain categories of data as categories that the 
ISA requires to fulfill its statutory duties and that licensed telecommunication 
service providers are obliged to transfer to the ISA.28 “Data” is broadly defined as 
“excluding the content of a conversation as defined in the Wiretap Law 1979-5739.”  
Accordingly, all types of metadata (rather than the exhaustive list in the 
Communications Data Law) are capturable under the ISA Law. As with content 
data, the ISA Law does not require any ex ante judicial review of the service’s 
metadata SIGINT practices. The use of data obtained under the ISA Law is subject 
only to the authorization of the ISA director. Such authorization may be given for 
periods not exceeding six months and renewed indefinitely.29 The rules governing 
the use, retention, security and processing of such data are set by the Prime 
Minister,30 and like all rules set under the provisions of the ISA Law, remain secret.31 
Certain provisions in the telecommunications law authorize the Prime Minister to 
order license holders to install or configure devices, or otherwise assist security 
authorities, including the ISA, to the extent it is required for the fulfilment of the 
authorities under the law.32
Section 11 of the ISA Law was enacted in 2002. It was added to the draft bill in 
between the first reading and the following readings of the law, and it didn’t receive 
 
25  § 3(g) Communications Data Law, supra note 20. Compare with the Australian provisions of 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) ss 175–176, 178–180B (Austl.). 
26  See § 7, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752, SH 1391, 150 (Isr.).  English translation 
available at https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm [https://perma.cc/C7E5
-BFHK].
27  ACRI, supra note 4. See also Tene, supra note 11 at 102–103.
28  § 11(b), ISA Law, supra note 10. 
29  § 11(d), ISA Law, supra note 10. 
30  § 11(e), ISA Law, supra note 10. 
31  § 19(a), ISA Law, supra note 10. 
32  § 13(b), Telecommunications Law. 
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much attention. The ISA director at the time, Avi Dicther, later said that “we tried 
to pass it under the radar screen, because it was potentially a very problematic 
section, even though that in 2002 not everybody fully understood the implications 
of metadata.”  Indeed, it was not until the early days of the first wave of COVID-19 
outbreak that the Israeli public became aware of “the Tool.” 
Within two weeks of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s televised statement 
regarding the intended use of digital monitoring tools to track coronavirus 
carriers,  an exposé by Ronen Bergman and Ido Shvartztuch revealed the existence 
of “the Tool.”  According to Bergman and Shvartztuch, during the nearly two 
decades since authorized to do so in the ISA Law, the service has been building up a 
voluminous database containing all the metadata transferred through Israeli 
telecommunication services.  
Unlike the contested American metadata bulk collection under the Section 215 
program,  the Tool collects more than mere call detail records (CDRs).  Rather, the 
Tool collects the widest possible definition of “Data” in the ISA Law, including 
CDRs, location data,  web browsing history,  technical router data (where 
available)  and possibly other categories of metadata from which valuable 
information could be extracted. This richness of the data types it collects renders 
 
33  Avi Dichter, speaking in College of Management, A Decade to the ISA Law, YouTube (Mar. 20, 
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BZ1sZqa0BR0 [https://perma.cc/D28Q-QZQR] (at 
minute 19, in Hebrew, translated by author). 
34  Judah Ari Gross, Netanyahu sparks privacy scare with move to track corona patients’ phones, The 
Times of Israel (15.3.2020), available at https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-sparks-
privacy-concerns-with-move-to-track-corona-patients-phones/ [https://perma.cc/W38U-SFZP].  
35  Ronen Bergman and Ido Shvartztuch, The 'Tool', the ISA secret database has been collecting data 
on all Israeli citizens and knows: where were you, whom you have spoken to, and when Yediot Aharonot 
(25.3.2020) [Hebrew] available at https://www.yediot.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5701611,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/64JS-QQTK].   
36  See Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Telephone Records 
Program Conducted Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT and on the Operations 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (2014). 
37  See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(k)(3) (2018). 
38  As can be inferred from its use for contact tracing. 
39  Bergman & Shvartztuch, supra note 35.
40  See for example Ran Bar Zick, Here's How to Protect Yourself Against Israel’s Cyber Snooping 
Haaretz (Nov. 12, 2020) (Isr.), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/tech-news/.premium-here-
s-how-to-protect-yourself-against-israel-s-cyber-snooping-1.9303295 [https://perma.cc/6DBZ-
L4VD]. 
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the Tool much more effective than its American parallel, whose utility is doubted.  
According to Bergman and Shvartztuch’s account, the Tool has been successful in 
countless counterterrorism operations. Naturally, other agencies have sought 
access to the Tool over the years, which has rarely been granted.  
The ISA’s immense database is allegedly safeguarded from misuse – however, 
there is very scarce evidence to support that assertion other than the assurances 
made by former ISA employees interviewed by Bergman and Shvartztuch. Despite 
the astounding public revelation by Bergman and Shvartztuch, a thorough Israeli 
public discussion of the Tool, echoing the ones held worldwide in the aftermath of 
the 
I I I . T H E  I S R A E L I  S I G I N T  O V E R S I G H T  E C O S Y S T E M 
Oversight of intelligence and law enforcement agencies is an essential feature 
of democratic regimes.   Activities that infringe upon human rights are inherent to 
 
41  See discussion at Susan Landau & Asaf Lubin, Examining the Anomalies, Explaining the Value: 
Should the USA FREEDOM Act’s Metadata Program be Extended?, 11 Har. Nat’l Sec. J. 308 (2020). 
42  Before Bergman and Shvartztuch’s revelation, the only public evidence of such an attempted 
access to the Tool’s database was when the state comptroller requested the ISA to provide location 
tracking and cellular traffic data of certain senior security officials involved in a scandal 
investigated by the Comptroller’s office. The state comptroller report bitterly complains the ISA’s 
refusal to comply. See State Comptroller Office, Report on the “Harpaz” Affair  24–25 (2012) 
[Hebrew]. Bergman and Shvartztuch mention additional attempts to use the Tool for purposes 
other than those authorized by law, see § 6, ISA Law, supra note 10, including propositions to use 
the Tool to track illegal immigrants, or to monitor the communications of high-ranking officials 
(including the director of the Mossad and the head of the Military Intelligence) to monitor for 
potential leaks of plans to strike Iran), which were denied. Bergman & Shvartztuch, supra note 35. 
43  See Amir Cahane, The (Missed) Israeli Snowden Moment Int’l J. Intelligence & 
Counterintelligence (forthcoming, 2021). 
44  On Intelligence oversight, see Hans Born, Towards Effective Democratic Oversight of Intelligence 
Services: Lessons Learned from Comparing National Practices, 3(4) Connections: The Q.  J. 1 (2004); 
Hans Born &  Ian Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best 
Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies (2005) [hereinafter Born & Leigh]; Who's 
Watching the Spies?: Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability (Hans Born et al. 
eds., 2005);  Democratic Control of Intelligence Services – Containing Rogue Elements 
(Hans Born & Marina Caparini eds., 2007); Aidan Wills, Guidebook: Understanding 
Intelligence Oversight (2010); Amy Zegart, Eye on Spies: Congress and the United 
States Intelligence Community (2011); International Intelligence Cooperation and 
Accountability (Hans Born et al.  eds., 2011); Overseeing Intelligence Services: A Toolkit 
(Hans Born & Aidan Wills eds., 2012) [hereinafter Toolkit]; Claudia Hillebrand, Intelligence 
Oversight and Accountability, in Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies 305 (Robert 
Dover, Michael S. Goodman & Claudia Hillebrand eds., 2014); Genevieve Lester, When Should 
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these agencies,  and therefore mechanisms should be in place that ensure such 
infringements are limited by standards of proportionality and necessity.  Proper 
oversight and control over intelligence and law enforcement services contribute to 
their accountability and to public trust,  whereas ineffective oversight ecosystem 
can serve as a veneer of legitimacy enabling unhindered misuse of power.  
Regardless of the legality of mass surveillance practices,  the potential reach of 
modern SIGINT activities requires the special attention of policymakers to design 
proper oversight mechanisms, ensuring minimal invasion of privacy and adherence 
to standards of necessity and proportionality, as well as safeguards against 
potential mission creep or private misuse of surveillance powers. As the ISA has 
been siphoning bulk metadata into the Tool for nearly two decades, the importance 
of its oversight mechanisms cannot be overstated.  
The Israeli SIGINT oversight ecosystem is basically its intelligence oversight 
array. At times it may focus on specific SIGINT matters. On the internal level, which 
some view as a primary guarantee against abuses of power,  we can only assume 
that members of the Israeli IC deploy basic automated measures and 
documentation to log and control internal access to restricted information. Former 
senior ISA employees claim that such measures and internal procedures are in 
place, and that the few occurrences of misuse of the Tool int its early days resulted 
in severe sanctions, so the contemporary organizational culture treats the Tool with 
 
State Secrets Stay Secret?: Accountability, Democratic Governance, and Intelligence 
(2015); Sudha Setty, Surveillance, Secrecy, and the Search for Meaningful Accountability, 51 Stan. J. 
Int'l. L. 69 (2015); Sarah Eskens, Ot van Daalen & Nico van Eijk, Ten Standards for 
Oversight and Transparency of National Intelligence Services (2015); Loch K. Johnson, 
Spy Watching: Intelligence Accountability in the United States (2018); Hugh Bochel, 
Andrew Defty &d Jane Kirkpatrick, Watching the Watchers: Parliament and the 
Intelligence Services (2014). 
45  See Aidan Wills, Understanding Intelligence Oversight 31 (2007); European 
Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Parliamentary Oversight of Security and 
Intelligence Agencies in the European Union 85 (2011); European Commission for 
Democracy Through Law, Report on The Democratic Oversight of the Security 
Services 4 (2015)[hereinafter Security Services Report]; Council of Europe Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Democratic and Effective Oversight of National Security Services 
23–27 (2015) [hereinafter COEHR]. 
46  Monica den Boer, Conducting Oversight, in Toolkit, supra note 44, at 69, 83. 
47 Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branches from 
Within, 115 Yale L. J. 2314, 2321 (2006). 
48  The ECtHR grand chamber ruling in the Big Brother Watch case is still pending (for the ruling 
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“the fear of God.”   
In addition to internal control mechanisms, Israeli law enforcement and 
security agencies have their own gatekeepers.  In the ISA, these are the legal 
advisor and the internal comptroller. The internal comptroller enjoys a special 
status, under a set of specific provisions in the ISA Law that strengthen the ISA 
comptroller’s independence and jurisdiction further than comptrollers of other 
public authorities.  Unlike the comptroller, the legal advisor is not defined by 
statute; Pursuant to the aftermath of the 300 affair in the 1980s, the legal 
department of the service has been reorganized and its legal advisor became a part 
of the service’s higher management.     
Executive oversight of SIGINT activities is performed on several levels. 
Wiretaps for national security purposes are subject to a ministerial ex ante 
authorization.  Although properly deliberated ex ante authorizations may be time-
consuming,  the larger share of oversight activity is ex post and is mainly handled 
by the Attorney General’s office.  
The Attorney General (AG) in Israel is the “authorized interpreter of the law vis 
a vis the Executive.”  This approach, different from the one prevailing in the U.S., 
 
50  Bergman & Shvartztuch, supra note 35. 
51  Amir Cahane & Yuval Shany, Oversight of Online Surveillance in Israel 190–194 
(2020) [Hebrew]. 
52  § 13, ISA Law, supra note 10.  
53  Eli Bachar, The Role of the Legal Counsel in Security Agencies 66 (2013) [Hebrew]. 
54  § 4, Wiretap Law, supra note 17. It should be noted that any wiretapping or other SIGINT 
practices of content acquisition whose targets are foreign are not subject to the provisions of the 
Wiretap Law. See CivA 4211/91 State of Israel v. Al Masri et al., 47(5) PD 636; Amir Cahane & Yuval 
Shany, Regulation of Online Surveillance in Israeli Law and Comparative Law 233–238 
(2019) [Hebrew]. 
55  See for example, the comment of UK’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David 
Anderson Q.C., that “my starting point was . . . the remarkable fact (at least to an outsider) that 
the Home Secretary routinely signs thousands of warrants per year, most of them concerned with 
serious and organized crime and the remainder with national security (principally terrorism).” 
David Anderson, A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review 270 
(2015).  Note that pursuant to AdminA 4349/14 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Prime 
Minister, (2015) (Isr.) [Hebrew], the annual number of ministerial wiretap warrants in Israel 
remains secret, and therefore the actual ministerial load is also unknown. 
56  HCJ 4267/93 Amitai-Citizens for Proper Administration and Integrity v. The Government of 
Israel, 47(5) PD 441, 475 (Isr.) [Hebrew]. 
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where the AG is a “hired gun,”  coupled with the Israeli AG’s statutory oversight 
functions, allows the office of the AG to significantly influence the interpretation of 
Israeli online surveillance law and practices. The Prime Minister provides a 
quarterly report to the AG about wiretap authorizations.  Heads of security 
services must promptly report to the AG any emergency authorization to wiretap 
privileged communications which was given in lieu of judicial authorization, and 
the AG may revoke them.  Pursuant to the provisions of the ISA Law, the Director 
of the ISA reports quarterly to the AG of authorizations to use the Tool.  According 
to former senior ISA employees, “the quarterly meetings with the AG are thorough, 
we argue . . . it is a very excruciating experience for the ISA Director.”  AG oversight 
of police SIGINT activities is more detailed. The police commissioner reports 
monthly to the AG regarding wiretap warrants.  The police commissioner must 
also promptly report to the AG any emergency authorization to wiretap in lieu of a 
judicial warrant, and the AG may revoke it.  Any application for a judicial warrant 
for wiretapping privileged communications is subject to the authorization of the 
AG.  
Parliamentary oversight of SIGINT in Israel is conducted through the Knesset’s 
committees. General oversight of intelligence matters is under the purview of the 
Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee and is handled through its 
Intelligence and Secret Services Subcommittee (hereinafter: the Intelligence 
Subcommittee). The Intelligence Subcommittee is the statutory parliamentary 
oversight body of the ISA.  Pursuant to the ISA Law, the ISA director reports to the 
Intelligence Subcommittee on matters pertaining to the service’s activities.  
Regulations and rules the prime minister is authorized to set under the ISA Law are 
subject to the approval of the Intelligence Subcommittee.  Also, any executive 
 
57   See Yoav Dotan & Michael R. Asimow, Hired Guns and Ministers of Justice: The Role of Government 
Attorneys in the United States and Israel, 19 Israel L. Rev. 1 (2016). 
58  § 4(d), Wiretap Law, supra note 17. 
59  Id. at § 5(b). 
60  § 11(d), ISA Law, supra note 10. 
61  Bergman & Shvartztuch, supra note 35. 
62  § 6(f), Wiretap Law, supra note 17. 
63  Id. at § 7(b). 
64  Id. at § 9. 
65  § 6, ISA Law, supra note 10. 
66  Id. at § 12(b). 
67  Id. at §§ 11(a), 21(b). 
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resolution authorizing the ISA to perform activities in an area that is not among its 
statutory core areas requires the Subcommittee’s approval.   
The meetings of the Intelligence Subcommittee are confidential, unless it has 
decided otherwise.  Accordingly, little is known of the Subcommittee’s activities; 
however it appears that its main concentration is on the operational efficacy of the 
Israeli IC, as well as budget review, rather than on matters of legal compliance and 
respect to human rights.  Many of the former members of the subcommittee 
interviewed by 
The parliamentary oversight of police activities is under the Internal Security 
Subcommittee, established in 2015. However, annual police wiretap reports and 
annual police metadata acquisition reports (when applicable)  are made to the 
Constitution, Law and Justice Committee.  
The Knesset may also elect ad hoc inquest committees in matters pertaining to 
SIGINT. In 1950, following the Mapam wiretap scandal, such an ad hoc committee 
was established.  A parliamentary investigatory committee was established also in 
2006, to “examine the legal framework and balances between the right to privacy 
and other public interests” and to “investigate the matter of wiretapping for crime 
prevention and detections (and not for national security) purposes.”  
Ex ante judicial oversight of SIGINT is limited. While wiretaps and metadata 
acquisition for law enforcement purposes are subject to a judicial warrant, ISA 
wiretaps and metadata acquisition are not.   The inadmissibility of unlawful 
 
68  Id. at § 7(b)(6). See also HCJ 2109/20 HCJ 2019/20 Ben Meir v. Prime Minister (unpublished) 
¶¶ 15–20 (2020) (Isr.), English translation available at https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/ben-
meir-v-prime-minister-0 [https://perma.cc/QL4M-RZZH] [hereinafter Ben Meir Ruling]. 
69  § 6(b), ISA Law, supra note 10. 
70  See Cahane & Shany (2020), supra note 51, at 194–95. 
71  Bergman & Shvartztuch, supra note 35. 
72  § 6(f) Wiretap Law, supra note 17.  Under §14, Communications Data Law, supra note 20, the 
minister responsible for the police shall annually provide statistics of metadata acquisitions 
under the law to the Knesset’s Constitution, Law and Justice committee.  Pursuant to its sunset 
provision, the section expired in 2012. 
73   See supra note 1. 
74  Summary of Hearings on Wiretap Inquiry Before the Knesset Investigatory Comm. (Jan. 26, 2009) 
[Hebrew]. 
75  § 9, Wiretap Law, supra note 17, is a singular exception, under which ISA wiretaps of 
privileged communications are also subject to a judicial warrant.   
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wiretaps incentivizes its ex post judicial review.  However SIGINT acquired for 
national security purposes is rarely used in court, and if so it is presented ex parte. 
Accordingly, the Israeli court cannot apply random oversight of ISA wiretaps nor of 
ISA metadata collection through litigation.  Nevertheless through constitutional 
or administrative challenges, Israeli court can potentially have an important role as 
an oversight body – at a policy level – of all governmental online surveillance 
practices, as it did the in ACRI v. Police or the Ben Meir case.   
 
Comptroller’s office has examined the use of police wiretapping.  The Israeli IC is 
also within its purview,  yet prior to the State Comptroller’s 2020 interim special 
report on Israel’s response to the COVID-19 crisis,  which examined the use of the 
ISA for contact tracing, no other review by the Comptroller of Israel’s IC’s SIGINT 
practices has been made public to date. Under Israeli law, the State Comptroller is 
highly independent and is free to select matter to review.  The law allows for parts 
of the State Comptroller’s reports to remain secret for reasons of national security, 
or in order to avoid an impairment of Israel’s foreign relations or its international 
trade.  The recommendations made by the State Comptroller are not legally 
binding.  
Although the Privacy Protection Authority (hereinafter: PPA and formerly 
known as ILITA (Israel Law and Information Technology Authority)), serves as 
Israel’s independent data protection authority, the extent of its oversight over 
national security is undefined and limited. Prior to the coronavirus epidemic, no 
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79  See Cahane & Shany (2020), supra note 51, at 204–06. 
80  Id. at n.894. 
81  State Comptroller's Office, The State of Israel Response to the Covid-19 Crisis - 
Special Interim Report (Oct. 2020) [Hebrew]. English version of the forward to the report is 
available at https://www.mevaker.gov.il/sites/DigitalLibrary/Documents/2020/COVID-19/2020-
COVID-19-003-preface-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/B66U-JEHU]. 
82  §2 (b), Basic Law: The State Comptroller, 5748, SH No. 1237 p.30 (Isr.). 
83  § 17 (a), State Comptroller Law, 5718-1958 [Consolidated Version], SH 248 p. 92, (Isr.). English 
translation available at https://www.mevaker.gov.il/En/Laws/Documents/Laws-Compotroller-
law.pdf, [perma.cc/TWK9-LJWU] [hereinafter State Comptroller Law]. 
84  HCJ 9223/10 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Prime Minister ¶ 21 (2012) (Isr.) 
(unpublished). 
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statutory provision has given the PPA explicit oversight authority over security 
services, and the exceptions granted thereto in the provisions of Israel’s privacy 
protection law  renders the PPA’s theoretical SIGINT oversight mandate virtually 
moot. 
Although not officially part of the SIGINT oversight ecosystem, civil society 
bodies and academia play a role, in Israel and everywhere else,  in keeping SIGINT 
practices in check. NGOs and academics alike provide the public with information 
regarding state SIGINT practices, and through litigation aim to shape its policies 
and legal framework. Civil society bodies were significant actors in the oversight 
ecosystem during the coronavirus outbreak. 
Eskens et al.  offered a set of standards that will be used here to assess the 
Israeli SIGINT oversight ecosystem. First, before outlining them, another standard 
should be mentioned: a detailed legislative framework for SIGINT is a condition for 
effective oversight.  Basic democratic precepts mandate such a framework.   In 
addition to the precondition of a legal framework regulating state practices of 
online surveillance, there are other standards according to which an oversight 
ecosystem could be assessed: 
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ProtectionofPrivacyLaw57411981unofficialtranslatio.pdf. 
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by Intelligence Services: Fundamental Rights Safeguards and Remedies in the EU, vol. 
I, at 12 (2015) [hereinafter FRA2015]; EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, Surveillance by 
Intelligence Services: Fundamental Rights Safeguards and Remedies in the EU, vol. II, 
at 15 (2017) [hereinafter: FRA2017]. 
87  Sarah Eskens, Ot van Daalen & Nico van Eijk, Ten Standards for Oversight and 
Transparency of National Intelligence Services (2015). 
88  See Lauren Hutton, Overseeing Intelligence Collection, in Toolkit, supra note 44, at 89, 100; Born 
& Leigh, supra note 44, at 19; FRA2017, supra note 86, at 11; Martin Scheinin (Special Rapporteur 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While 
Countering Terrorism), Rep. Pt. II: Compilation of Good Practices on Legal and Institutional Frameworks 
for Intelligence Services and Their Oversight, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/46 (May 17, 2010); Ian Leigh, 
Overseeing the Use of Personal Data, in Overseeing Intelligence Services, supra note 44, at 105, 
122; Thorsten Wetzling, Intelligence Governance in Post Cold-War Germany: A Steady Beat of Constant 
Trouble? in Intelligence Oversight in the Twenty-First Century (Ian Leigh and Njord 
Wegge eds., 2019). 
89  See Scheinin, supra note 88, at ¶ 34; Born & Leigh, supra note 44, at 17, 41; Signals 
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Communications Surveillance 27 (May 2014). 
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• Complete oversight – an effective oversight ecosystem must be 
institutionally, temporally, procedurally and substantively complete. 
Institutionally, the oversight ecosystem should be composed of 
internal and external actors, of which one should be a designated 
independent oversight body.  Internal and executive controls are 
insufficient.  Temporally, an oversight ecosystem should encompass 
ex ante, ex post and ongoing review.  Procedurally, oversight should 
attend to all aspects of the intelligence cycle: collection, retention, 
selection and examination and analysis. The substantive completeness 
of an oversight ecosystem requires attention to matters of legal 
compliance and operational efficacy, as well as human rights 
adherence and budgetary controls. The literature does not always 
mention all these as oversight purposes, and indeed oversight bodies 
tend to focus on two purposes or even a single one.   
• Independence – at least one oversight actor should be independent.  
Independence – both institutional and political –  influences the 
efficacy of many oversight bodies.  EU jurisprudence tends to rely on 
the judicial branch as an ex ante independent SIGINT oversight body.  
In lieu of judicial oversight, the jurisprudence of the European Court 
Of Human Rights requires an independent oversight actor.  
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• Ex ante oversight – Eskens et al. recommend that the SIGINT oversight 
ecosystem should be temporally complete, and they stress the 
importance of ex ante oversight.   
• Power to declare a measure unlawful and to provide for redress – effective 
SIGINT oversight requires that some of the oversight actors have the 
power to declare surveillance measures unlawful, or to refrain from 
authorizing the security and intelligence services to use it ex ante,  as 
well as providing individual redress.  
• Adversarial principle – as ex ante proceedings are often ex parte, any 
judicial or quasi-judicial oversight body authorizing ex ante online 
surveillance measures should incorporate adversarial positions.  
Special advocates or amicus curiae may serve as such adversarial 
function.   
• Expertise – SIGINT oversight is a complex task that requires 
interdisciplinary knowledge and skills in national security, 
intelligence, legal and technological matters. Accordingly, the efficacy 
of an oversight ecosystem depends on the expertise of its personnel.  
Without proper expertise, oversight actors that may even enjoy 
unrestricted access to data cannot critically examine it. Furthermore, 
expertise allows for stronger independence, as it reduces capture and 
deference.  
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• Sufficient Resources – budgets of intelligence services, and in particular 
those who develop and operate online surveillance measures, tend to 
be exorbitant,  while their oversight bodies are usually under-
budgeted.  Proper allocation of funds, which reflects the extent of 
their mandate,  allows for effective oversight and fortifies both the 
expertise and the independence of oversight bodies.  
• Transparency – establishing public trust in the oversight ecosystem 
(and subject to its findings, in the IC) requires a degree of 
transparency.  Due to national security considerations, full 
disclosure of a finding is rarely possible, especially in operational 
matters,  but layered transparency could be introduced to SIGINT 
oversight ecosystems.   
• Access to information – effective oversight of intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies requires maximal access to information.  Full 
access to information should be the default rather than the 
exception,  but the breadth of information access should match the 
needs of the oversight mandate.  
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The prerequisite of a proper oversight ecosystem – a detailed legislative 
framework of government online surveillance activities – is not fully met in Israel. 
Israeli online surveillance law is dated, thin, and shrouded in secrecy.  
Furthermore, applying these standards to the Israeli SIGINT oversight ecosystem  
shows that it is incomplete. The lack of a dedicated and independent expert 
oversight body is noticeable – judicial ex ante oversight of SIGINT activities in Israel 
is limited, and lack adversity, and there is no external continuous oversight of the 
routine operations of SIGINT measures. The State Comptroller – one of the only 
oversight actors that can lead thorough, in depth inquiries in matters pertaining to 
SIGINT –rarely uses its authority. Also noticeable is the lack of transparency, as the 
rules governing the Tool are confidential, and any parliamentary oversight activities 
thereof are secret by default. In the following we shall see how the Israeli SIGINT 
oversight ecosystem reacted to the government’s resolution to authorize the ISA to 
use the Tool for contact tracing purposes during the coronavirus outbreak.  
I V . C O V I D - 1 9  I N  I S R E A L :  C O U N T E R T E R R OR I S M  M E A S U R E S  T O  W A R D  O F F  
A  P L A G U E  
A few weeks following the report of the first confirmed coronavirus carrier, who 
had come aboard a Diamond Princess cruise ship to Israel,  the number of 
coronavirus carriers increased exponentially.  Israel responded in mid-March by 
introducing a series of restrictive measures, including a general lockdown  and 
the use of location metadata for both epidemiological investigations and for 
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TA].  
I S R A E L ’ S  S I G I N T  O V E R S I G H T  E C O S Y S T E M  
471 
monitoring compliance of self-quarantined individuals.  The lockdown managed 
to contain the spread of the virus by May.  However, with no exit strategy, a 
second wave of the pandemic was soon to follow. In early July, Health Minister 
Edelstein stated that Israel was entering a second wave of COVID-19,  and in mid-
September, a second general lockdown was in place.  
Israel entered the first wave of the pandemic with a caretaker government at a 
political stalemate, and three consecutive parliamentary elections held within a year 
did not resolve with the forming of a coalition.  However, the coronavirus crisis 
may have served as a catalyst – or an excuse – for an opposition party, Kahol Lavan, 
to form a coalition with reigning Likud party.  Negotiations between the parties 
took place during April, and by May 2020, the new government was sworn in.
As early as March 9th, the Ministry of Health (MOH) requested that the ISA  
complement a singular epidemiological investigation with its technological 
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new-year-with-a-heavy-heart-and-a-patchwork-lockdown-1.9165820 [perma.cc/Q5VR-AJKV]. 
123  On the political crisis in Israel, see Itai Bar-Siman-Tov, Covid-19 meets politics: the novel 
coronavirus as a novel challenge for legislatures, 8 THEORY PRAC. LEGIS. 11, 30–31 (2020). 
124 Raoul Wootliff, Netanyahu and Gantz said forming unity government; Blue and White collapses,
Times of Isr. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.timesofisrael.com/gantz-and-netanyahu-said-
forming-unity-government-blue-and-white-collapses [https://perma.cc/DHH3-R2FH].
125  Knesset approves establishment of Israel's 35th government; Prime Minister Netanyahu: “Unity 
government costs much less than fourth election,” Knesset News (May 17, 2020), https://main.knesset.
gov.il/EN/News/PressReleases/Pages/press1752020r.aspx [https://perma.cc/4J75-ETNH]. 
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measures – the Tool.  The ISA, pursuant to an internal approval by its legal advisor, 
provided the MOH with a list of places where the patient stayed, as well as the details 
of individuals who had come into close contact with the patient. On March 11th, the 
ISA's legal advisor, in consultation with senior AG employees, agreed that for future 
requests, a "new procedure [would] be established, subject to the approval of the 
AG."  However, the next day the MOH requested the ISA's assistance regarding a 
second Coronavirus patient. The Director of the ISA approved the request. The 
following day, the ISA Director approved expanding the scope of the service's 
assistance to the MOH, subject to the approval of the AG. The position of the AG's 
office at the time was that the proper legal path to regulate the ISA's coronavirus 
surveillance was through a government resolution authorizing it.  
At these early stages, the core tenets of the ISA's coronavirus surveillance 
operation had already been established: the ISA would not provide MOH with direct 
access to the Tool, and would provide MOH only with designated information (the 
route of a coronavirus carrier and the persons with whom she has been in close 
contact rather than raw metadata); the ISA would refrain from any corona-related 
enforcement activities; and the ISA would not directly contact Israeli citizens.   
The government initially attempted to pass Resolution 4897, authorizing the 
ISA to assist in the national effort to reduce the spread of the novel coronavirus  
pursuant to provisions of the ISA Law, which permits the ISA to undertake activities 
beyond its statutory defined remit, subject to a government resolution approved by 
the Intelligence Subcommittee.  The resolution authorized the ISA to "obtain, 
collect and process Technological Data in order to assist the Ministry of Health in 
an epidemiological investigation whose purpose is examining locations and routes 
of a confirmed coronavirus carrier or of individuals who may have contracted 
coronavirus as well as individuals with whom they have been in contact."   
 
126 State Comptroller's Office, supra note 81, at 97. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. at 99. 
129  Id. at 98–99. 
130  Government Res. No. 4897, Authorizing ISA to assist in the national effort to reduce the 
spread of the Novel Coronavirus, (Mar. 15, 2020). [Hebrew] https://www.
law.co.il/media/computer-law/gov-corona-shbak.pdf perma.cc/K3B8-2B78] [hereinafter 
Resolution  4897]. 
131   See supra note 68. 
132  Resolution 4897, supra note 130, at § 1. Under a purpose limitation clause, the resolution 
authorized the ISA to use the undefined “Technological Data” only for the aforementioned 
purpose.  Pursuant to the resolution, ISA's assistance to the MOH is subject to a request by either 
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However, Resolution 4897 did not pass. The Intelligence Subcommittee 
meeting to approve the Resolution was scheduled a few hours before the 22nd 
Knesset and its parliamentary committees were dissolved and the new Knesset was 
sworn in. The Intelligence Subcommittee refused to merely rubber-stamp 
Resolution 4897. While deliberating on Resolution 4897, however, the subcommittee 
was dissolved without reaching a conclusion or an approval of the Resolution. In 
lieu of parliamentary authorization, the government resolved to enact the 
Emergency Coronavirus Regulations, which authorized ISA to conduct 
Coronavirus surveillance for epidemiological investigations, and authorized the 
police to obtain communications metadata of quarantined individuals (specifically, 
their last cellular location) for monitoring purposes.  Within days, the High Court 
of Justice issued an interim order in the matter of Ben Meir, following an appeal by 
several NGOs and activists, under which the powers of the ISA under the Emergency 
Coronavirus Regulations was to be suspended within a few days unless a proper 
parliamentary oversight committee was established. The court also suspended the 
police's power to obtain communication data for quarantine enforcement under the 
Emergency Coronavirus Regulations until further notice.  
Following the reestablishment of some of the Knesset committees, including 
the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee and its Intelligence Subcommittee, the 
latter began a series of meetings to discuss the proper legal framework to authorize 
ISA Coronavirus surveillance as well as to draft a temporary amendment to the 
Communication Data Law that would authorize the police to obtain cellular location 
to monitor individual compliance with quarantine orders. Upon the expiration of 
the Emergency Coronavirus Regulations the Intelligence Subcommittee approved 
 
the chief executive officer of the ministry, or the head of the public health services. ISA's response 
shall be made directly thereto and shall include only data directly required for the aforementioned 
purpose.  The resolution explicitly stated that the authorization thereunder shall not authorize 
ISA to enforce quarantine order or monitor individuals who are under quarantine.  The resolution 
was meant to stay 
133  See supra note 119. 
134  HCJ 2109/20 Ben Meir v. Prime Minister (Mar. 19, 2020) (Isr.) (unpublished, interim order). 
English translation available at https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/
opinions/Ben%20Meir%20v.%20Prime%20Minister.pdf [perma.cc/3LWZ-YF2W]. The police 
emergency powers were later to be reinstated by the high court of justice in an updated interim 
order. See HCJ 2109/20 Ben Meir v. Prime Minister (Mar. 24, 2020) (Isr.) (unpublished, interim 
order). English translation available at https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/viewpoints/coronavirus-
interim-order-update perma.cc/3AYK-T9QV]. 
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the amended Resolution 4950, effective for a 30-day period.  The draft 
amendment to the Communications Data Law was eventually shelved by the 
Minister for Internal Security. 
The Ben Meir case was decided towards the end of effective period of Resolution 
4950, and the High Court of Justice ordered that if the government sought to 
authorize ISA to engage in coronavirus surveillance, such authorization should be 
made through legislation. However, the court also allowed for further extensions of 
Resolution 4950 by “a few weeks,” should the government pursue such a legislative 
process. Indeed, the Subcommittee allowed for several more extensions 
136
Within a fortnight after the expiration of the Resolution 4950, the second wave 
of the pandemic ushered in a renewed sense of urgency. By June 25, the bill was 
approved by the cabinet and subsequently passed in a preliminary reading in the 
Knesset plenum. The bill was split in two: the main bill and temporary provisions. 
The latter were effective for 21 days to allow for immediate reauthorization of ISA 
coronavirus surveillance activities, while allowing for more thorough parliamentary 
deliberations on the main bill, which was eventually enacted on July 20 as The Law 
to Authorize the ISA to Assist in the National Effort to Contain the Spread of the 
Novel Coronavirus and to Promote Use of Civilian Technology to Locate Individuals 
who were in Close Contact with Patients (hereinafter: the Authorization Law).
The Authorization Law authorizes the ISA to process Technological Data  
 
135  Government Res. No. 4950, Authorizing ISA to assist in the national effort to reduce the 
spread of the Novel Coronavirus, (Mar. 31, 2020) https://www.gov.il/he/departments/
policies/dec4950_2020 [hereinafter: Resolution 4950]. On Resolution 4950, see Amir Cahane, 
Counterterrorism measures to counter epidemics: Covid-19 contact tracing in Israel, Blogdroiteuropéen 
(Jul. 18, 2020), https://blogdroiteuropeen.com/2020/07/18/counterterrorism-measures-to-
counter-epidemics-covid-19-contact-tracing-in-israel-by-amir-cahane/ [perma.cc/9RN3-ALQX]. 
136   Omer Kabir, Lawmakers Extend Spy Agency’s Covid-19 Patient Tracking Program by Three Weeks, 
CTech (May 26, 2020), https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0,7340,L-3827350,00.html 
[perma.cc/JM54-A6FV]. 
137  Defined in Section 2 of the Authorization Law, supra note 7, as “Identification Data, Location 
Data and Call Record Data, excluding the contents of a call as defined in the Wiretap Law [supra 
note 17].” Identification Data are defined therein as “Name, ID number, telephone number and 
date of birth”; Location Data are defined as “The location data of a cellular phone device”; and “Call 
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regarding a patients  and individuals with whom they had been in close contact 
for the 14-day period preceding his diagnosis, and to provide MOH with the 
Patient's Location Data during said period and with the Identification Data, the 
time of contact with the Patient and the location of that contact, of individuals who 
have been in close contact with the Patient.  These powers are effective only 
pursuant to a government declaration of ISA authorization, which is subject to the 
approval of the 
The Authorization Law includes several oversight mechanisms. The first one, 
mentioned above, is the government declaration of authorization. The legal 
instruments preceding the Authorization Law were set to expire within weeks of 
their promulgation and automatically 
Foreign 
Affairs and Security Committee
The provisions of the Authorization Law require both the ISA Director and 
MOH representative to provide the  and the 
Attorney General's office with detailed weekly reports.  Unlike the reports made 
to the Subcommittee pursuant to the ISA Law,  these reports are not deemed 
 
Record Data” are defined as “Incoming call phone number, Outgoing call phone number and the 
time of the call.” Compare the definition of Technological Data to the inclusive definition of both 
Technological Data and of ‘Data’ in Section 11 of the ISA Law, supra note 10, as well as to the 
narrower language defining Metadata in the Communications Data Law, supra note 20.
138  Defined in Section 2 of the Authorization Law, supra note 7, as “a patient with a positive 
laboratory result to the novel coronavirus.” Compare with the ISA Law, supra note 10, and see Ben 
Meir interim order, supra note 134, at ¶ 4(a). 
139  § 5(a), Authorization Law, supra note 7. 
140  § 3-3a, Authorization Law, supra note 7. 
141  § 3(d), Authorization Law, supra note 7. 
142  § 12a, Authorization Law, supra note 7.  Under section 12a(b), such civilian contact tracing 
technologies are to be installed only voluntarily, subject to the user's consent. 
143  Under section 3a of the Authorization Law, the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee may 
approve, shorten, or not approve the declaration's effective period.  When the Committee decides 
not to approve a declaration, it expires within 24 hours. 
144  § 19, Authorization Law, supra note 7.  
145 § 19, ISA Law, supra note 10. 
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classified by default. MOH procedures under the Authorization Law are to be made 
public,  while ISA procedures thereunder are classified.  
A redress mechanism is also placed in the Authorization Law, which allows 
individuals who were identified by the ISA as persons who have been in close 
contact with a patient to appeal to the MOH. The MOH may request in such cases 
that the ISA reexamine the data which indicated that the appellant was in close 
contact with a coronavirus carrier, and must inform the appellant within 24 hours 
of its decision.  More than 63% of the appeals submitted under this procedure 
were granted, indicating the Tool's low efficacy in identifying coronavirus 
carriers.  
The Authorization Law also establishes a ministerial committee to reexamine 
the necessity of further use of ISA measures pursuant to its provisions. The 
ministerial committee, which includes the Prime Minister, the alternate Prime 
Minister,  and the Justice, Health, and Intelligence Ministers, as well as other 
ministers as the government may decide, considers the contribution of ISA 
activities to containing the spread of the pandemic and the existence of alternatives 
thereto, in light of the right to privacy. The ministerial committee is to be provided 




148  § 8, Authorization Law, supra note 7.  
149  Privacy Protection Authority, PPA Opinion in Accordance with the Law to Authorize the ISA 
to Assist in the National Effort to Contain the Spread of the Novel Coronavirus (Temporary 
Provisions) 8 (2020) [hereinafter PPA Opinion No. 5], available in Hebrew only at 
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/privacy-shabak-coronavirus_5/he/5OPINION.pdf; The 
State Comptroller Interim reports states that the number of individuals who were notified that 
they were in close contact with patients is lower than the number of contacts provided by the ISA 
to the MOH, and therefore the error rate of the ISA is even higher. See State Comptroller's 
Office, supra note 81, at p. 110. One of the possible reasons for the ISA's inaccuracy is its use of 
Call Record Data (as defined in the ISA under the Authorization Law), as there were complaints 
of individuals who were identified as having contacts with coronavirus carriers with whom they 
merely talked on the phone. Dikla Ahron Shafran, Did you talk on the phone or SMSed with a confirmed 
patient? you might be sent to quarantine KAN (November 2020) available at https://perma.cc/6F8B-
CN4E.  
150  See § 13a, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5761-1992, SH 1780 158 (Isr.).  English 
translation available at https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm [https://
perma.cc/C7E5-BFHK]. 
151  § 12, Authorization Law, supra note 7. So far, the PPA produced seven such opinions: PPA 
Opinion No. 1, supra note 14; PPA Opinion No. 5, supra note 149; Privacy Protection Authority, 
PPA Opinion in Accordance with the Law to Authorize the ISA to Assist in the National 
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However, the ministerial committee inherently cannot be independent. It is 
part of the executive and as such perhaps plays the part of an internal oversight 
mechanism, but it may lack sufficient independence from changing political 
pressures to be an effective oversight measure. Furthermore, although the statutory 
reports allow the PPA to voice its opposing opinion against ISA coronavirus 
surveillance, their reports did not seem to have any influence on the 
recommendations of the ministerial committee or the continuous approvals by the 
Knesset's 
the Authorization Law.  
V . T H E  O V E R S I G H T  E C O S Y S T E M  R E S P O N S E  T O  C O V I D - 1 9  
A. Internal and Executive Oversight 
During the first wave of the pandemic, internal and AG oversight of ISA 
activities remained confidential. The AG office was central in the process of drafting 
the various legal instruments authorizing ISA activities – appearing before the 
Intelligence Subcommittee and during the first days of the pandemic – involved in 
authorizing the first two contact tracing operations. It appears that while the AG 
office opted for government authorization under section 7(b)(6) of the ISA Law, 
which entails partial parliamentary oversight by way of the Intelligence 
Subcommittee's approval, it did allow the exceptional authorizations by the ISA 
 
Effort to Contain the Spread of the Novel Coronavirus (Temporary Provisions) 8 (2020) 
[hereinafter PPA Opinion No. 2], available in Hebrew only at https://www.gov.il/Blob
Folder/reports/privacy-shabak-coronavirus_2/he/privacy-shabak-coronavirus-2.pdf; Privacy 
Protection Authority, PPA Opinion in Accordance with the Law to Authorize the ISA 
to Assist in the National Effort to Contain the Spread of the Novel Coronavirus 
(Temporary Provisions) 8 (2020) [hereinafter PPA Opinion No. 3], available in Hebrew only at 
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/privacy-shabak-coronavirus_3/he/privacy-shabak-
coronavirus-3.pdf; Privacy Protection Authority, PPA Opinion in Accordance with the 
Law to Authorize the ISA to Assist in the National Effort to Contain the Spread of the 
Novel Coronavirus (Temporary Provisions) 8 (2020) [hereinafter PPA Opinion No. 4], 
available in Hebrew only at https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/privacy-shabak-corona
virus_4/he/privacy-shabak-coronavirus_4.pdf Privacy Protection Authority, PPA Opinion 
in Accordance with the Law to Authorize the ISA to Assist in the National Effort to 
Contain the Spread of the Novel Coronavirus (Temporary Provisions) 8 (2020) 
[hereinafter PPA Opinion No. 6], available in Hebrew only at https://www.gov.il
/BlobFolder/reports/privacy-shabak-coronavirus-6/he/opinion6.pdf; Privacy Protection 
Authority, PPA Opinion in Accordance with the Law to Authorize the ISA to Assist in 
the National Effort to Contain the Spread of the Novel Coronavirus (Temporary 
Provisions) 8 (2020) [hereinafter PPA Opinion No. 7], available in Hebrew only at 
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/privacy-shabak-coronavirus-7/he/777777777777777.pdf 
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Director for contact tracing analysis of the first two COVID-19 patients without any 
such scrutiny. It is unknown whether internal AG discussion raised concerns of the 
potential mission of the ISA's Tool. Prima facie, however, the AG office allowed it to 
occur, perhaps mitigating it by preferring parliamentary involvement in the 
rulemaking process. 
B. Judicial Oversight  
As mentioned above, there is no ex ante judicial oversight of ISA SIGINT 
measures. Accordingly, ISA COVID-19 surveillance reached the High Court of 
Justice only through a petition from civil society bodies that at first challenged the 
constitutionality of the Coronavirus Emergency Regulations, and later challenged 
the legal framework set under the 4897 Resolution. 
The interim order in Ben Meir reflected a position favoring parliamentary 
oversight: the court conditioned continued ISA authorization under the 
Coronavirus Emergency Regulations on relevant oversight parliamentary 
committees being formed.  Two months into the COVID-19 outbreak, the Ben Meir 
ruling continued emphasizing parliamentary supremacy. It focused on the Israeli 
non-delegation doctrine,  under which the ISA may be authorized to engage in 
coronavirus location tracking only through primary legislation, rather than by a 
government resolution (albeit subject to the approval of a parliamentary 
subcommittee) or emergency regulations (that are not enacted by the Knesset).  
The Ben Meir ruling did pay tribute to privacy considerations, albeit as dicta,  while 
its holding focused on the proper interpretation of the term “National Security” 
within the context of the “mission creep” clause of the ISA Law.  
Subsequent to the enactment of the Authorization Law, it was challenged in the 
High Court of Justice.  Currently the case is pending, yet it seems that the court 
 
152  Ben Meir interim order, supra note 134, at ¶ 4(a). 
153  Elena Chachko, “The Israeli Supreme Court Checks COVID-19 Electronic Surveillance” LAWFARE. 
(5.5.2020). [https://perma.cc/E7N7-A5F3].  
154  § 7(b)(6), ISA Law, supra note 10. 
155  See § 38-39, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5761-1992, SH 1780 158 (Isr.).  English 
translation available at https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm [https://
perma.cc/C7E5-BFHK]. 
156  See Ben Meir ruling, supra at 68, at ¶¶ 35–42. 
157  HCJ 6732/20 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Knesset (2020) (Isr.) The preceding 
challenges to the Authorization Law were dismissed on procedural grounds. For the Israeli 
petitions, see HCJ 5746/20 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Knesset (2020) (Isr.) For an 
overview of the petition see Adalah, ACRI, Adalah, PHRI & Privacy Israel petition Israeli 
I S R A E L ’ S  S I G I N T  O V E R S I G H T  E C O S Y S T E M  
479 
is not comfortable with the ongoing use of the ISA measures for coronavirus, 
following an interim order demanding to know why should the ISA coronavirus 
surveillance is restricted to cases where patients refuse to cooperate with 
epidemiological investigations.  The court further demanded the respondent 
explain why the MOH is not upholding its statutory duties to promote alternative 
civilian technologies.   
C. Parliamentary Oversight  
Two days following the Prime Minister's public statement regarding the 
intended use of digital counterterrorism measures to identify COVID-19 carriers,  
the Intelligence Subcommittee adjourned to discuss the government request to 
approve Resolution 4950. However, that meeting was terminated before reaching a 
resolution, because the Knesset dissolved and a new parliament was sworn in. 
The first round of hearings by the newly-formed Intelligence Subcommittee 
was devoted to drafting the amended Resolution 4987. At its early stages, the 
Subcommittee expressed a tepid position: they would approve the amended 
Resolution 4987 for a limited 30-day period, but further approval would be 
conditioned upon thorough and detailed evidence prepared by an expert 
government body explaining that no  alternatives were available.  This stance 
gradually eroded as the outbreak progressed and the Knesset coalition was formed. 
By the end of the first effective period of Resolution 4987, the Subcommittee’s 
chairperson, MK Ashkenazi, was to become the Foreign Minister in the forming 
coalition. MK Ashkenazi did not insist on any evidence  regarding available 
 
Supreme Court: Repeal law authorizing Shin Bet to track citizens with COVID-19, 
https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/10085 [https://perma.cc/9HFS-JC2R]. For a critique of 
the procedural dismissal of these petitions and others See Adam Shinar, Why decide if you can avoid? 
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(Unpublished, Interim Order) See also Yonah Jeremy Bob, High Court puts the heat on Shin Bet 
coronavirus surveillance, The Jerusalem Post (Nov. 11, 2020). English available at 
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surveillance-649389 [https://perma.cc/UME3-3EZF].  
159  § 12, Authorization Law, supra note 7. 
160  Supra note 34. 
161  Intelligence and Secret Services Subcommittee Minutes, Knesset Security and Foreign 
Affairs Committee, protocol no. 3, March 30, 2020, at 40. 
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alternative measures to the ISA coronavirus surveillance  and approved the 
extension of the effective period for a week in order to allow the government  to 
pursue a legislative path to ISA authorization, per Ben Meir.  As MK Ashkenazi left 
the Subcommittee for greener pastures, the incoming chairperson, MK Hauser, also 
from a coalition party, exhibited an approach more tolerant of the government's 
position, favoring ISA surveillance and less insistent on the development and 
promotion of civilian alternatives.  
Thematically, the Subcommittee's discussions tended to focus on the necessity 
of the Tool for containing the spread of the pandemic, rather than assessing its 
proportionality. Even in the early stages of discussion, members of the committee 
had at times drifted into general questions of Israel's COVID-19 strategy. During 
April 2020, the Subcommittee also engaged in several discussions pertaining to the 
drafting of an amendment to the Communications Data Law, authorizing the police 
to obtain location data for quarantine monitoring purposes, even though oversight 
of the police forces is not within the Subcommittee's purview.  At some point 
during the second wave of the pandemic, the discussions were steered towards MK 
Hauser's initiative to reduce the length of the quarantine period from 14 to 10 days. 
Even if this step could have increased the Israeli public’s overall compliance with 
quarantine orders, its relevance to the extension of the declaration period under the 
Authorization Law is indirect at best. 
The initial expertise gap of the Intelligence Subcommittee members, as 
reported by ,  was bridged in a series of confidential 
Subcommittee hearings with ISA members, at least one of which was attended by 
an academic expert.  Nevertheless, some statements made in the early meetings, 
and the change made in the Subcommittee’s membership pursuant to the 
formation of the government, indicate that its members were not fully informed at 
 
162  Intelligence and Secret Services Subcommittee Minutes, Knesset Security and Foreign 
Affairs Committee, protocol no. 8, April 30, 2020, at 13–14. 
163  Ben Meir ruling at ¶ 34.  
164
empowered to obtain Location Data directly from licensed 
telecommunication providers, with no involvement of the ISA. 
165  Supra note 71. 
166  Intelligence and Secret Services Subcommittee Minutes, Knesset Security and Foreign 
Affairs Committee, protocol no. 1, March 26, 2020, at 36. 
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all times.  Changing statistical indices  could have also contributed to 
information gaps and confusion of policymakers.  
The Subcommittee, however, did open to the public most hearings pertaining 
to ISA coronavirus surveillance from its first discussions on the matter, contrary to 
the default rule classifying the Intelligence Subcommittee's hearings. Furthermore, 
the Subcommittee invited civil society bodies and privacy experts to participate in 
its meetings (although during the October-November meetings on the extension of 
the declaration period they were hardly encouraged to voice their opinions.)  
Nevertheless, despite its rare public openness, and even rarer moment of 
independence,  the Subcommittee appeared to be influenced by the political shifts 
in the background, as well as by its chairperson's agenda. The Subcommittee further 
lacked initiative. For example, the initiative to narrow the scope of ISA's surveillance 
"  came from the ISA, rather from the parliamentary 
overseers. 
D. The Privacy Protection Authority  
Initially, the PPA was not involved in the authorization of the first two instances 
of ISA coronavirus surveillance. According to the schedule of the acting head of the 
PPA, only after Prime Minister Netanyahu’s televised statement regarding the 
intention to employ digital counterterrorism means to contain the pandemic did 
the management of the PPA discuss the matter.  Although its schedule indicates 
that the PPA was preoccupied with ISA coronavirus surveillance matters as early as 
mid-March, the PPA did not make any public statement on the matter, nor did PPA 
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representatives attend the early hearings of the Intelligence Subcommittee. 
Towards the end of April, the PPA was invited to join the Subcommittee only after 
the Justice Minister received a letter from a group of privacy experts 
Gradually, the PPA's voice was heard. Following the suggestion of the Defense 
Minister to source a private company to develop an Israeli “health scoring” 
system,  the PPA published a critical survey of credit scoring systems.   In late 
May, the PPA published a survey of COVID-19 digital monitoring systems, which 
concluded that the ISA measures were the most privacy-infringing measures 
available.   
As of mid-July, under the Authorization Law, the PPA provided the Ministerial 
Committee with its opinion regarding the ISA authorization.  In its seven opinions 
(as of December 2020),  the PPA consistently raised an opposing voice to the 
continuing use of the ISA's measures for Coronavirus location tracking, doubting 
its efficacy,  calling for the promotion and development of alternative civilian 
measures. In its opinions under the Authorization Law, the PPA also expressed its 
opposition to any involuntary surveillance measure.  The PPA further noted no 
correlation had been found between the use of technological measures (voluntary 
or involuntary) in other jurisdictions and the spread of the pandemic.    
Nevertheless, although the PPA is granted a statutory role, it appears to be that  
of a mere privacy advocate. The PPA lacks any effective teeth – it cannot veto the 
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authorization of ISA surveillance like the Foreign Affairs and Security Committees. 
Any research prepared for the PPA opinions appears to rely on publicly available 
sources, and accordingly it may be the case that the PPA lacks any actual oversight 
powers that provide it with better access to information than civil society bodies. 
However, the PPA opinions, like the State Comptroller’s interim reports, may 
influence other oversight actors as they serve to reinforce legal or policy arguments 
in court or in parliamentary deliberations.  
E. The State Controller  
As the first wave of the pandemic ended, the State Comptroller Matanyahu 
Englman stated in parliament that his office would review ISA coronavirus location 
tracking as part of its annual review.
During July and until mid-August 2020, the State Comptroller's Office 
investigated the ISA's coronavirus surveillance activities. In addition to performing 
an audit on the ISA, the Comptroller's Office also engaged with the ministry of 
Intelligence and the PPA. 
The part of the report that was made public  analysed the effectiveness of the 
Tool by offering two different indices – SNR (signal to noise ratio) and BDA (battle 
damage assessment). According to the report, the overall BDA, which is the ratio 
between the number of confirmed patients examined by the ISA and the number of 
confirmed patients discovered by the ISA, was 28.5% –for nearly every three patients 
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referred to the ISA, the Tool detected one other coronavirus carrier.  The report 
further stated that the SNR, which is the ratio between the number of patients 
detected by the ISA and the overall number of contacts detected as associated with 
them, was 3.5% – out of more than 25 individuals that the ISA identified to have been 
in close contact with a coronavirus carrier, only one was eventually found to be a 
confirmed carrier of the virus. The report compared the SNR of the ISA measures to 
the SNR of the still ongoing traditional epidemiological investigations, which was 
much higher (nearly 24%). Despite this data, the report did not draw any direct 
conclusion as to the efficacy of the Tool. 
Another revelation made by the report is that ISA location tracking activity for 
the first two coronavirus patients referred to by the MOH was undertaken without 
any legal basis, based on the authorization of the ISA legal advisor and the ISA 
Director.  The report also made note of several incidents in which data was not 
properly handled.  The matter of alternative civilian measures was also discussed, 
and the the report called on the MOH and the Ministry of Intelligence to promote 
such measures.  The report recommended that the Ministerial Committee remap 
the process and form a recommendation if, under current circumstances, 
considering the efficacy of ISA activities and potential privacy harms, there was 
sufficient reason to continue relying on ISA coronavirus surveillance or if other 
alternatives based on thorough epidemiological investigations might be 
preferable.   
F. Civil Society 
As an oversight actor, civil society was engaged in several fronts during the 
coronavirus epidemic. First, it researched and informed public debate on ISA 
coronavirus surveillance and its civilian alternatives;  second, civil society bodies 
and activists were the initiators of the Ben Meir case, and the subsequent 
proceedings against the Authorization Law; and, finally, civil society bodies, 
activists and privacy experts took an active role in the Intelligence Subcommittee's 
hearings (at first), providing parliamentarians with opinions and background 
information.  
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The protest letter, as mentioned above, rendered the PPA more involved in the 
ISA coronavirus public discourse, and contributed to its inclusion in the 
parliamentary subcommittee's discussions.  A bill drafted by civil society bodies 
and privacy experts proposed a framework promoting alternative measures to ISA 
surveillance.  Albeit not fully acknowledged by the Intelligence Subcommittee, the 
bill appears to have influenced the drafting of the Authorization Law. Section 12a, 
added pursuant to the civil society suggested bill, provides that the Health Minister 
must provide the public with civilian contact tracing technology, and promote its 
use.  
However, during late November, civil society bodies and experts regularly 
invited to the Intelligence Subcommittee committee hearings regarding ISA 
coronavirus surveillance notified the Chairperson that they would be boycotting the 
hearings. Their letter claimed that the Subcommittee had been avoiding a serious 
discussion about ISA coronavirus surveillance, and would rather drift into matters 
outside its purview, such as shortening the mandatory quarantine period, while also 
neglecting the discussion of the failure of Israel's contact tracing app, Hamagen 
2.0.  The letter also claimed that during the previous two months, civil society 
experts had been no more than extras, hardly heard in the Subcommittee hearings 
held via Zoom.    
Overall, civil society organizations, activists and privacy experts were crucial to 
the oversight ecosystem during the coronavirus pandemic, as they were an 
independent voice promoting privacy considerations and offering policy 
alternatives. Their activities served as a catalyst and prompted other oversight 
bodies – such as the PPA and the courts - to act. 
G. Revisiting Eskens et al.  
The framework offered by Eskens et al. and expanded on in part 3 of this paper 
can be used to examine the performance of the Israeli SIGINT oversight ecosystem 
during the coronavirus crisis, as was described above. 
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• Detailed Legislative Framework – the absence of a detailed legislative 
framework regulating Israel's SIGINT practices allowed for extended 
deliberations by the parliamentary oversight body – the Intelligence 
Subcommittee – which took an active part in designing the legal 
frameworks ruling the ISA coronavirus location tracking. Had there been a 
more detailed legislative framework, coronavirus surveillance would have 
been addressed as a routine (albeit under unique circumstances) oversight 
issue.   
• Complete oversight – while the SIGINT oversight ecosystem in Israel 
remained institutionally incomplete during the coronavirus pandemic, 
lacking a designated independent SIGINT, some improvements are 
noticeable in the narrow context of ISA coronavirus surveillance. An appeal 
mechanism was introduced, and the temporal completeness of the Israeli 
oversight ecosystem has improved as well – as the continuity of the 
parliamentary and executive oversight of ISA coronavirus surveillance was 
enhanced under the Authorization Law, which requires both MOH and ISA 
to provide them with weekly reports.   
• Independence – as mentioned above, Israel's oversight ecosystem lacks an 
independent actor. The parliamentary Subcommittee did exhibit a 
modicum of independence at the early stages of its response to the 
government's intention to utilize the ISA for coronavirus surveillance, yet 
this independence fluctuated and eroded with the political backdrop. 
Additionally, as much as the High Court is indeed independent, it is neither 
a dedicated or continuous oversight body, and its tendency to delay the post 
Ben Meir appeals against the Authorization Law  may be attributed to 
external political pressures. 
• Ex ante oversight. Although ex ante oversight is less relevant to location 
tracking,  the declaration mechanism in the Authorization law could be 
deemed as providing the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee 
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with some measure of ex ante authorization powers.  
• Power to declare a measure unlawful and provide redress. The High Court of 
Justice did use its powers to order the police and the ISA not to use their 
powers under the Emergency Coronavirus Regulations. The appeal 
mechanisms under the Authorization Law may not provide full redress to 
individuals quarantined based on the ISA's Tool, but it offers them a way to 
cancel the quarantine order. 
• While the Adversarial principle is more relevant in the ex ante context, its 
instances in ex post oversight and policymaking regarding ISA COVID-19 
surveillance were evident. However, the rare openness of the Intelligence 
Subcommittee and its initial inclusion of civil society bodies allowed the 
latter to express an adversarial position, thereby mitigating  potential 
capture of the subcommittee members.  The Ben Meir case was handled 
with both parties present in the court room, rather than in ex parte 
proceeding (which are more common in ex ante cases). 
• The increased Transparency was most discernible in the Israeli SIGINT 
oversight ecosystem during the coronavirus epidemic. The oral arguments 
in Ben Meir were streamed online in real time, as were most of the 
Intelligence Subcommittee's hearings. Unlike the 1950s two-line report by 
the Israeli’s Knesset ad hoc Parliamentary Subcommittee for the Matter of 
Secret Wiretapping Devices and Secret Party Services,  the Intelligence 
Subcommittee hearings generated a plethora of reports and documents 
offering opinions and data to an extent previously unavailable. However, 
the quality of some of the data, as a measure of the Access to information 
standard set by Eskens et. al, was at times less than optimal. Reports made 
by various stakeholders included conflicting information, which at times 
caused policymakers to compare apples with oranges. Changes in data 
computations were introduced in a manner meant to present the utility 
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and efficacy of the ISA tool in a better light.   
An overall assessment of the Israeli SIGINT oversight ecosystem during the 
coronavirus epidemic shows increased levels of transparency and procedural 
adversity. However, the low level of independence exhibited by the main oversight 
actors may indicate that the increased levels of transparency and procedural 
adversity were supported by ephemeral conditions unique to the biological nature 
of the surveillance target, and, as the next part suggests, that these slight 
improvements in the oversight ecosystem might not apply to routine SIGINT 
practices. Furthermore, given that the Israeli IC kept on using SIGINT measures for 
national security purposes during the coronavirus outbreak, it would be safe to 
assume that these changes were compartmentalized to apply only to coronavirus 
surveillance matters. 
V I . C O V I D - 1 9  A S  A  T E S T  C A S E ?  
A side effect of the coronavirus was piercing the veil of secrecy surrounding 
Israel's SIGINT oversight ecosystem. However, some of the circumstances that 
allowed this rare glimpse may not apply to the routine workings of the SIGINT 
oversight ecosystem. 
First, the bio-political nature of the ISA’s coronavirus location tracking differs 
greatly from the routine ISA surveillance for counterterrorism and 
counterintelligence purposes. As coronavirus location tracking is not terror-related, 
nor is it political, there is hardly any reason for secrecy. There is no adversary whose 
awareness of being under surveillance might bring about operational risks. 
Second, since no one is immune to COVID-19, there is a certain likelihood that 
overseers and policymakers will also contract the virus and be subjected to 
surveillance. This possibility may contribute to enhanced sensitivity regarding 
privacy matters, whereas it is highly unlikely that overseers or policymakers shall 
become targets of counterterrorism surveillance. Accordingly, the willingness to 
sacrifice rights and liberty for national security purposes is greater when the “other” 
is expected to pay the toll. 
Third, targeted coronavirus surveillance, or even untargeted coronavirus 
surveillance might not be significantly improved by judicial authorization. Whereas 
surveillance for law enforcement purposes – and, at times, for national security 
purposes – requires a certain estimate of human culpability, the standards applying 
to coronavirus are not legal but medical. It has become, therefore, the subject matter 
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of experts.  Therefore, the question of ex ante review of online surveillance is 
rendered moot within the context of coronavirus surveillance, while it is one of the 
most salient lacunae in the Israeli SIGINT oversight system.  
Additionally, the SIGINT oversight ecosystem during the COVID-19 pandemic 
was mainly concerned with policy-level oversight. The focus of the Subcommittee 
and to some extent the High Court in Ben Meir were the  necessity of ,  and the 
safeguards and controls required for, ISA coronavirus surveillance. Although some 
policy determinations, especially those attempting to assess the efficacy of ISA 
surveillance, attempted to be data driven, the day-to-day working of ISA 
surveillance was rarely reviewed. 
Even before the coronavirus, Cohen claimed that in Israel the executive branch 
overtook the Knesset, and that parliamentary oversight in Israel was ineffective.  
The COVID-19 outbreak significantly marginalized parliaments worldwide vis-a-vis 
the executive branch.  However, due to the political circumstances in Israel upon 
the outbreak, the Intelligence Subcommittee was in a position of independence 
before a coalition formed. Once the coalition formed, the dominance of the 
executive was reestablished and, accordingly, the Subcommittee repeatedly 
approved extending the ISA's authorizations. While the source of these 
circumstances is not COVID-19, it is highly unlikely to resurface in a future SIGINT-
related crisis. 
Although the coronavirus presented a set of unique circumstances for the 
Israeli SIGINT oversight ecosystem, some lessons can still be carried forward.  The 
coronavirus affair demonstrated the importance of transparency. Transparency, 
which fosters democratic accountability of intelligence services in general, also 
allows oversight to flourish. Information is, after all, the life blood of oversight. 
Transparent information flow (subject, of course, to reasonable confidentiality) to 
the public is the precondition to the work of civil society bodies, whose contribution 
to the oversight ecosystem throughout the covid-19 epidemic was of immeasurable 
importance. However, transparency is not the statutory default but the exception, 
and during ordinary, COVID-free times the Intelligence Subcommittee, the ISA and 
the AG retain strict confidentiality as to SIGINT and its oversight.  
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Despite the important role played by civil society and academia in creating 
feedback loops inside the oversight ecosystem (through litigation or the call for 
strengthening the position of the PPA, which in their turn contributed to an 
independent discourse), a dedicated expert SIGINT oversight body cannot be 
replaced thereby. I have suggested elsewhere that an independent SIGINT oversight 
agency, modeled after the British Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPCO), will 
be able to fill in the gaps in the Israeli oversight ecosystem.  The suggested 
independent Israeli SIGINT commission, which would (similar to IPCO) have 
quasi-judicial powers to authorize online surveillance warrants, could not be 
downplayed in the coronavirus scenario to the position of the PPA as a toothless 
privacy advocate, as it would have the authority to veto coronavirus surveillance.  
While the Authorization Law did introduce some enhanced oversight 
mechanisms, their scope is limited to the contact tracing practices of the ISA. It is 
unlikely that the Authorization Law will transform into a wider legal reform of the 
Israeli SIGINT laws and oversight ecosystem, neither pursuant to the pending 
decision in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Knesset,  nor following a 
parliamentary initiative. However, the lessons derived from the COVID-19 epidemic 
illustrate the importance of transparency, expertise and independence for the 
SIGINT oversight ecosystem in ordinary times, as well as the significance of the 
inclusion of well-informed civil society organizations in the deliberative process.  
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